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STRICT LIABILITY COMES OF AGE
IN OHIO: ALMOST
STEPHEN J. WERBER*
N JUNE 1977 the Ohio Supreme Court decided Temple v. Wean United,
Inc.,' and adopted the doctrine of strict liability for product liability litiga-
tion, thereby following a national trend. Earlier decisions had discussed a
theory similar to strict liability and had engendered considerable confusion
as to the substantive theory supporting possible recovery.2 Temple apparently
ended the confusion.
The case arose out of an industrial accident in which a power press
was accidentally activated, causing the severing of plaintiff's arms. Suit was
filed against the manufacturer of the press, with the primary issue being
whether the machine was defective at the time of manufacture. The court
seized this opportunity to elucidate its theory of law and clarify the intent
of its prior rulings by announcing a clear standard. However, a portion of
the syllabus and opinion' limited the definition of "defect" so as to poten-
tially place an unnecessary restraint on the application of the strict liability
doctrine. This restraint is inconsistent with the historical roots of the
doctrine.
By the early 1960's courts in the United States had become aware
that traditional theories of negligence and warranty did not adequately pro-
tect the user of various products other than drugs and cosmetics. Thus,
the California Supreme Court in the landmark decision of Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.' applied the doctrine of strict liability to permit
recovery in an action for injuries caused by an allegedly defective power
tool. The plaintiff was injured when a piece of wood flew out of a "Shop-
smith" (a combination power tool incorporating elements of saw, drill and
*B.A., Adelphi University; J.D., Cornell University; LL.M., New York University; Member,
New York Bar; Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law. The author wishes to express his gratitude to James Szaller of the Ohio Bar and
Carole Roth, a third year student at the College of Law, for their assistance in the prepa-
ration of this article.
1 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
2 E.g., McDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 42 Ohio St. 2d 8, 326 N.E.2d 252 (1975); Gast
v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 39 Ohio St. 2d 29,313 N.E.2d 831 (1974); State Auto Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Chrysler Corp., 36 Ohio St. 2d 151, 304 N.E.2d 891 (1973); United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 244, 257 N.E.2d 380 (1970);
Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
. 50 Ohio St. 2d at 318, 364 N.E.2d at 267 (syllabus paragraph 5); 50 Ohio St. 2d at
326-27, 364 N.E.2d at 273.
4 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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wood lathe) and struck him in the head. The trial court ruled that there
was no evidence that the retailer was negligent or had breached an express
warranty. It further ruled that the manufacturer was not liable for any
implied warranty. Only a limited number of issues were presented to the
jury: implied warranty as to the retailer, negligence, and express warranty
as to the manufacturer. On appeal the court reversed and its opinion ex-
tended the manufacturer's liability by applying the doctrine of strict liability.
The policy reasons expressed for this decision focused largely on the concept
of risk allocation, and the court determined that the risk could be better borne
by manufacturers.'
The impact of Greenman gave added impetus to the already well
received decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc.,' so that in a relatively short time the doctrine of strict
liability became the majority view in American jurisdictions.' The single
most comprehensive statement of the doctrine is set forth in section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.'
Despite these precedents and the fact that a lucid definition of the
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than
by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. Sales warranties serve
this purpose fitfully at best.. . it should not be controlling whether plaintiff selected the
machine because of the statements in the brochure, or because of the machine's own
appearance of excellence that belied the defect lurking beneath the surface, or because he
merely assumed that it would safely do the jobs it was built to do.
Id. at 61, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
G 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Claus Henningsen signed a purchase order for a new
automobile on May 7, 1955 and took delivery on May 9. The various documents which
accompanied the sale included a disclaimer of liability. On May 19, the co-plaintiff (Claus'
wife) was operating the vehicle when something allegedly snapped causing her to lose control
of the vehicle and crash. The trial court determined that there was no evidence to support
a prima facie case of negligence, partly due to the fact that there was no expert testimony,
and permitted the jury to consider only the warranty cause of action. Defendants appealed
from the resulting plaintiff's verdict. The main issues on appeal focused on a lack of privity
and the disclaimer clause. The affirming decision became a foundation for the subsequent
development of strict liability in tort, not because it adopted the doctrine, but because it
abolished the need for privity in contract, demolished the disclaimer clause, and helped
establish the policy reasons which justify strict liability. Since this decision, courts facing
similar issues have almost consistently abolished the privity requirement or adopted strict
liability in tort. In a sense this decision is the watershed from which Greenman flowed. The
privity requirement was further eroded with the acceptance of Uniform Commercial Code,
section 2-318. Among the large number of casenotes analyzing this decision, the following
are illustrative: Note, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 873 (1960); Note, 29 FOPDHAM L. REV. 183 (1960);
Note, 74 HAjv. L. REV. 630 (1961); Note, 59 MICH. L. REV. 467 (1961); Note, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 453 (1961).
7 See Chart of Strict Liability, [1977] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4060.
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
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doctrine was available to it, the Ohio Supreme Court did not adopt a
doctrine analogous to strict liability until 1966.1 The year before, in Ingliss
v. American Motors Corp.,10 the court set the stage by allowing recovery
in a tort action premised upon express warranty, despite the absence of
privity. However, when the time came, the court did not define its doctrine
in terms of existing precedents but rather established in Lonzrick v. Re-
public Steel Corp." the somewhat unique standard of:
[a]n action in tort which is based upon the breach of a duty assumed
by the manufacturer-seller of a product. This duty is assumed by the
manufacturer by reason of his implicit representation of good and
merchantable quality and fitness for intended use when he sells the
product. This duty is breached when a defect in the product causes the
collapse of the product and is the direct and proximate cause of injury
to a person whose presence the defendant could reasonably anticipate. 2
The plaintiff in Lonzrick had made no allegations of negligence and
the court ruled that an action in contract was not proper since there was
no contractual relationship between the parties. Although the court did not
so state, it is evident that despite its decision in Ingliss, the court was still
concerned with the privity question. The court was thus faced with a need
to permit recovery on some theory other than negligence or contract and
did so in a fashion which, in actuality, combined a "tort" element, despite
the failure to allege negligence, and a "contract-warranty" element, despite
the absence of a contractual relationship. The court termed this standard
"an action in tort for breach of an implied warranty.' 3
As to defenses, the parallel to traditional strict liability is highly visible
as the court ruled that assumption of the risk was a valid defense to this
new concept, but no mention of contributory negligence was made." This
makes eminent good sense as the doctrine approved did not require a
showing of negligence. It would have been illogical to permit a contributory
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
9See Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
10 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965). See also Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,
167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
11 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
12 Id. at 230, 218 N.E.2d at 188.
a3 Id. at 235, 218 N.E.2d at 191.
14/d. at 237, 218 N.E.2d at 193.
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negligence defense. But since assumption of the risk is available in any
tort claim, it can properly be considered in relation to the Ohio version
of strict liability.
For most purposes it was clear that the decision contained a convoluted
definition and application of the doctrine of strict liability in tort which
the dissenting opinion recognized.1" However, the court continued to adhere
to its strained definition, thus inviting problems in terms of the application
of the statute of limitations as well as the possibility of exemplary damages.
6
In 1970 the court reiterated its position in United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. v. Truck and Concrete Equipment Co., declaring:
[T]he plaintiff in a products liability case is not restricted to prosecuting
his action on the basis of negligence alone but may proceed in an
action in tort based upon the theory of implied warranty, notwith-
standing that there is no contractual relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant."
15 Chief Justice Taft stated in his dissenting opinion:
The Court of Appeals recognized that "use of the word 'warranty' is probably improper"
in explaining what this court is doing in the instant case, and that what it is really
doing is recognizing a cause of action for "strict tort liability."
Quite obviously, as is apparent from the authorities cited, the legal conclusion set forth
in paragraph two of the syllabus represents a somewhat disguised statement of what is
usually referred to as the doctrine of "strict liability."
6 Ohio St. 2d at 245, 218 N.E.2d at 197 (citations omitted).
16 The potential conflict as to the statute of limitations is between OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.10 (Page 1976) (two years from date of injury in personal injury cases) and OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.98 (Page 1976) (UCC breach of contract actions' four year provi-
sion running from date of accrual, which is defined as delivery or tender date except as
modified in connection with specific future warranties). Thus, if strict liability is analogized
to the contract action, it is possible to bar the action before the injury occurs. On the other
hand, if the analogy is negligence, no such bar is possible. Either analogy is proper under
Ohio decisions prior to 1977. The federal courts, when interpreting Ohio law, have utilized
the personal injury limitation period. Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.
1972). Accord, Lee v. Wright Tool & Forge Co., 48 Ohio App. 2d 148, 356 N.E.2d 303
(1975). Such an interpretation appears to be consistent with United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 244, 257 N.E.2d 380 (1970).
Cf. Val Decker Packing Co. v. Corn Products Sales Co., 411 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1969),
which applied the contract statute.
The potential conflict as to exemplary damages arises from the fact that such damages
are normally awarded only in instances of outrageous or malicious conduct, but the conduct
of the manufacturer (in this sense) is largely irrelevant to a claim premised upon strict
liability. Again, the result will depend upon whether the strict liability case is more closely
analogous to negligence or warranty. Those few cases relying on Ohio law which have
reviewed the issue have failed to make the analysis necessary for a clear understanding and
instead assume that the question is to be decided on the tort analogy. Gillham v. Admiral
Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Drayton v. Jiffee
Chemical Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975). A more detailed analysis is seen in
G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, Sacramento County, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 218 (1975).
17 21 Ohio St, 2d 244, 251, 257 N.E. 2d 380, 384 (1970).
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Although some members of the court, as evidenced by the dissent
in Lonzrick and at least one appellate court opinion," recognized the ob-
vious, the majority of the court retained its obscure position in State Auto
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chrysler Corp.9 Here it became almost painfully
clear to virtually everyone except the writers of the opinion that Ohio had
adopted strict liability. The opinion delineated the elements necessary to
establish a cause of action for strict liability in warranty as follows:
In cases involving strict liability, the theory of plaintiff's case, proof
of negligence is not required, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is applicable only insofar as it allows a jury to infer negligence once
a plaintiff has met his burden of proof. That burden of proof, as
stated by this court ... consists of plaintiff alleging and proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) there was, in fact, a defect
in the product manufactured and sold by the defendant; (2) such
defect existed at the time the product left the hands of the defendant;
and (3) the defect was the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries or loss.2"
The concept of strict liability in tort, though clarified in terms of acceptance
by use of these three elements, was obfuscated by the court's reference to
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Under the facts of the case it is apparent
that the court was attempting to indicate that a negligence action premised
on res ipsa would not be accepted.21
18 Groves v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 22 Ohio App. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 759 (1969). But see
Mielke v. Singara Grotto, Inc., [1975] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 7663 (Ohio App. 1975)
(implied warranty in tort).
19 36 Ohio St. 2d 151, 304 N.E.2d 891 (1973).
20 Id. at 156, 304 N.E.2d at 894 (citations omitted). A comparison of the elements set forth
in the Restatement definition of strict liability in tort with those established in State Auto
underscores the correlation:
State Auto Mutual Ins. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A
A defect in the product manufactured sells a product in a defective condition
and sold ... unreasonably dangerous...
such defect existed at the time the prod- it... does reach the user or consumer
uct left the hands of the defendant ... without substantial change...
the defect was the direct and proximate is subject to liability for physical harm
cause of the plaintiff's injuries or loss ... thereby caused...
See 36 Ohio St. 2d 151, 304 N.E.2d 891 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS, §
402A, Comment n (1965).21Negligence may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. The usual product
liability case is premised upon direct evidence coupled with circumstantial evidence in
the field of expert testimony, especially as it relates to accident reconstruction including
proof that an alleged defect was the cause of the injury preceding event. Res ipsa
is a form of circumstantial evidence which, when available, is of considerable assistance to
the plaintiff. The essential elements necessary to bring the concept into play are generally
viewed as: (1) the event is of a kind which would not occur in the absence of negligence,
(2) the event was caused by an instrumentality in the exclusive control of the defendant
and (3) the plaintiff in no way contributed to the occurrence of the event or harm. These
elements can rarely be met in a product case. Where the elements are present it is possible
for a jury to infer negligence and thus to find for the plaintiff even in the absence of addi-
tional direct evidence or expert testimony.
Spring, 1978]
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The court's absolute confusion is perhaps best illustrated in Gast v.
Sears Roebuck and Co." The catalyst for this decision was a fire allegedly
caused by a defective television set. The court intelligently specified the
factors which necessitated imposition of liability on grounds other than
negligence and warranty, but stubbornly insisted that the doctrine to be
utilized was something other than strict liability in tort, even though that
phrase was specifically mentioned:
In the usual products liability case users of products need not show
that the manufacturer was negligent. Courts recognized the difficulty
in proving that the specific defect which caused the injury could have
been eliminated had the manufacturer exercised ordinary care. Based
upon that recognition, courts developed a new remedy - strict liability
in tort for breach of implied warranty of fitness for ordinary use. Ohio
adopted that remedy in Lonzrick .... The obvious advantage is that
plaintiff need only show that the defect existed at the time the product
left the manufacturer and that the defect was the proximate cause of
the injury.2
3
The Ohio Supreme Court again addressed the relationship of res ipsa
to strict liability since the trial court had given a res ipsa charge to the jury
even though plaintiff had failed to establish any negligence and despite
the fact that the claim was founded on negligence rather than implied war-
ranty. The court ruled that a res ipsa charge under the circumstances was
improper since, if it were permitted, the distinction between strict liability
and negligence would disappear in a product liability case." It was made
clear that regardless of how the strict liability doctrine was to be enunciated,
the courts would maintain a distinction between this theory and negligence
theory and would not tolerate the use of res ipsa concepts in a strict liability
situation.
From its beginning, dating perhaps back to 1958, and with an early
childhood period ending in 1965, the doctrine of strict liability reached
adolescence in 1966 and remained there for over a decade before reaching
the age of majority in 1977. With some sadness we must recognize that
the court which nurtured the doctrine uprooted its effectiveness in the
very opinion in which the age of majority was reached. This uprooting,
coupled with the effects of legislation now pending in the Ohio General
22 39 Ohio St. 2d 29, 313 N.E.2d 831 (1974).
23 Id. at 31, 313 N.E.2d at 833 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). A similarly convoluted
definition is found in McDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 42 Ohio St. 2d 8, 10, 326 N.E.2d 252,
253 (1975), "implied warranty, which is a form of strict liability in tort".
24 39 Ohio St. 2d at 32, 313 N.E.2d at 834.
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Assembly,25 may well sound the practical, if not theoretical, death knell of
strict liability in Ohio.
Temple v. Wean United, Inc.2" posed a virtually perfect fact pattern
for clarification of the court's theory for recovery in a products liability
suit, since the court was reviewing a motion for summary judgment granted
to defendant and under the facts recovery had not been possible under
any theory. 7 Plaintiff was operating a power punch press during the course
of her employment. As plaintiff was placing aluminum extrusions into the
back die of the press, an unknown number of extrusions fell from the
bolster plate in front of her onto the dual operating buttons. The result
was the activation of the press and consequent amputation of plaintiff's
arms.
The machine was manufactured and sold in 1954 by Federal Machine
and Welder Company, now Wean United, Inc., to a division of General
Motors. General Motors sold the machine to Turner Industries, which com-
pany immediately sold it to plaintiff's employer, Superior Metal Products, Inc.
Upon receipt of the press, Superior immediately made several modifications
in the machine, the most significant of which was to lower the location of
the dual operating buttons from a position approximately shoulder high
to a position approximately waist high. It was established that the machine
could not have been activated by the falling extrusions had the dual oper-
ating buttons been positioned as they were prior to this modification. 8
25 Am. Sub. H.B. No. 319, 112th G.A. (1977-78). See also text accompanying notes 50-54
intra.
26 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
27 Plaintiff's suit was premised on the traditional triumvirate of negligence, implied war-
ranty and strict liability in tort (in many cases the warranty assertions are express and im-
plied). The opinion attempts to maintain a clear demarcation between negligence and strict
liability. There is no need for it to maintain such a position as to implied warranty because
the court's position is that implied warranty and strict liability are virtually indistinguish-
able legal theories. The court is apparently unaware of the impact of its decision on the
design defect area. In this case, a key assertion of the plaintiff was design defect as distinct
from malfunction. The court makes no mention of the design defect in its analysis of strict
liability although it is aware that malfunction is not involved. This omission may constitute
a sub silentio disapproval of the strict liability theory in design cases, but this reading is
hard to reconcile with the apparent intent of the court. Such a reading is consistent with the
position advanced by some writers and possibly by prior decisions. A fuller discussion of
the design defect aspect is set forth in text accompanying notes 38-41 infra.
28 The court noted that:
The evidence of record reveals that prior to the date of the accident Superior had a
company policy which specified that all power press activating buttons be located fac-
ing upward, waist high, 24 inches apart. Pursuant to this policy, upon receipt of the
press, Superior altered the existing method of guarding by lowering the buttons, which
were at that time shoulder high. Clearly, in relation to the danger of unintentional activa-
tion, this alteration was a "substantial change" within the meaning of Section 402A
(1) (b). Indeed, it is our conclusion that there was no original defect of any sort in
the punch press, and that, as a matter of law, Superior's alteration of the safety device,
Spring, 1978]
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It was evident that there was no "defect" at the time of manufacture and
sale, and recovery was not possible. The court however, aware of the con-
fusion engendered in its prior descriptions of the applicable legal theories,
firmly and concisely adopted the definition of strict liability in tort and
approved the text as set forth in the Restatement as well as indicating that
the comments would assist analysis in the area of product liability:
Since Greenman was decided, the rule of the Restatement had been
adopted or approved by the vast majority of courts which have con-
sidered it. Because there are virtually no distinctions between Ohio's
"implied warranty in tort" theory and the Restatement version of strict
liability in tort, and because the Restatement formulation, together
with its numerous illustrative comments, greatly facilitates analysis in
this area, we hereby approve Section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts 2d.29
Syllabus paragraph (1) consists of a verbatim statement of strict
liability as set forth in 402A, and is thus clearly made a part of the law
of the State of Ohio. Applying the facts of the case to the doctrine of strict
liability as now approved, the court found that there had been a substantial
change in the product's condition from the time of its initial sale and that
therefore the plaintiff could not recover. Furthermore, there was no duty
to warn. This was extended to speculative anticipation of how manufactured
components, not in and of themselves dangerous or defective, can become
potentially dangerous dependent upon the manner in which they are inte-
grated into the original unit. Had the opinion ended here, it would have
been a most satisfactory decision in which several goals were reached: first,
a clear definition and acceptance of the doctrine of strict liability in tort;
second, a clear analysis of the type of modification which would relieve a
manufacturer of liability; third, a clear analysis of the proper parameters of
the duty to warn as it relates to component parts.
However the opinion did not end on such a note. Instead, syllabus
paragraph (5) sets forth a principle of law virtually unique to the State of
Ohio: "Where an order of the Industrial Commission specifies that either
a fixed barrier guard or a two-hand tripping device is an acceptable method
of guarding a power press, a manufacturer is not negligent in designing a
press which utilizes a two-hand tripping device."3 The body of the
coupled with the utilization of the press for the stamping of stock long enough to
bridge the 24 inch gap between the buttons, was the sole responsible cause of the maim-
ing of Mrs. Temple.
50 Ohio St. 2d at 323, 364 N.E.2d at 271 (1977).
2 9
1d.
30 Id. at 318, 264 N.E.2d at 269.
[Vol. 11:4
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opinion makes clear that this portion of the syllabus raises the ex-
istence of an Industrial Commission standard to a level of complete
defense. To reach this aberrant conclusion the court first points out that
as indicated in Gosset v. Chrysler Corp.,"1 the manufacturer is under a duty
to use such reasonable care under the circumstances as to make his product
safe for the use for which it is intended. Such care does not mandate that
the product be made accident-proof or foolproof. A similar standard was
enunciated in connection with the doctrine of liability for second collision
injuries, i.e., crashworthiness, in a line of cases commencing with Larsen
v. General Motors Corp.2 In Larsen the court declared that an automobile
manufacturer has no duty to make his product accident-proof or foolproof,
but was under a duty to use such care in design as to avoid subjecting the
user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.
Perhaps recognizing that the general rule of Gosset and similar cases
could impose the equivalent of absolute liability or force the role of insurer
upon manufacturers, the court placed a limit on such potential by establishing
a new and complete defense as a matter of law. Premised specifically upon
the "difficulty and open endedness inherent in passing judgment upon the
reasonableness of a manufacturer's conscious design choices,""3 the court
determined it appropriate to look to statutory regulations. The Industrial
Commission Safety Code specifically approved the use of either a fixed
barrier guard or a two hand tripping device as proper in the construction
of a power press so as to prevent the hands or fingers from entering the
danger zone. The court states: "In view of this regulation... this court
holds that the question of whether or not the manufacturer was negligent in
not providing fixed barrier guards should be answered, as a matter of law,
in the negative.''
Although this ruling was directed to the claim premised upon negli-
gence, and the court has consistently ruled that negligence is an action
distinct from strict liability, it is hard to fathom the court's use of the
industrial regulation as being limited to negligence. Since such a ruling
would make clear that the design of the product was not defective in a
negligence sense, it would be difficult to then rule that despite the validity of the
design it somehow was sold "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
31 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966).
32 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). The use of this standard has led to considerable difficulty
and may be inappropriate despite its current acceptance. See Hoenig, Understanding 'Second
Collision' Cases in New York: A Suggested Guide to Application of Bolm, 20 N.Y.L.F. 29
(1974); Hoenig & Goetz, Rational Approach to Crashworthy Automobiles: The Need for
Judicial Responsibility, 6 Sw. U. L. REv. 1 (1974); Hoenig & Werber, Automobile 'Crash-
worthiness' An Untenable Doctrine, 20 CEv. ST. L. REv. 578 (1971).
33 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 326, 364 N.E.2d 267, 273.
34 Id.
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to the user or consumer." In essence, the court has raised the use of the
state of the art defense to a new level. In the past, compliance with the
industrial state of the art was viewed as evidence of due care and the ab-
sence of negligence, but it was not viewed as conclusive on the issue."
The industrial safety standards, such as those established by the Ohio
Industrial Commission, are essentially codifications of existing industry
practice and are invariably written only after extensive industrial input. If
the industry claims it cannot meet a specified standard, that standard often
is not imposed. Anyone who has followed the debates of Congress and the
Department of Transportation's efforts to impose safety standards for ve-
hicles can recall ample illustrations of this problem.
If the premise is correct, that use of the industrial standard to negate
negligence as a matter of law will carry over to the determination of the
existence of a defect in a product for strict liability standards, it is hard
to see the doctrine enunciated in Temple as anything but a retreat from
necessary consumer protection. 6 To make matters worse, nothing in the
established Safety Code or the enabling legislation indicates a desire that
the standards set should be used as a complete defense to a product claim."
The court does not mention the possibility of federal standards meeting
the same goals and thus also becoming available as a defense. Since the
court left this open and permitted the use of the government standard to
limit its powers to develop common law doctrine for the imposition of
liability, it is at least possible that a similar result could occur even in the
face of legislation which clearly states that it is not intended to be in
derogation of the common law, as is the case with the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.8 Should the court take this position,
35 See Witherspoon v. Haft, 157 Ohio St. 474, 106 N.E.2d 296 (1952); Morris v. Cleveland
Hockey Club, Inc., 157 Ohio St. 225, 105 N.E.2d 419 (1952); Mills v. City of Springfield,
75 Ohio L. Abs. 150, 142 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio App. 1956); Spitler v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 70 Ohio L. Abs., 321, 128 N.E.2d 445 (Ohio App. 1954). See generally FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIAnmlrrY, § 6 (1976); Note, The State of the Art Defense in Strict
Products Liability, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 651 (1974).
36 A plaintiff's attorney might well consider filing a complaint without an allegation of
negligence or dismissing such count prior to trial whenever a relevant statute would decide
the issue adversely to his client's interest. The effect of a directed verdict or jury charge
along the lines of Temple could devastate the remainder of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff might
also gain a tactical advantage since the defendant's use of the standard will not be as effective.
.17 Although a significant number of cases fall within the parameters of the Safety Code's
enabling legislation, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4101.11, 4107.23 (Page 1976), none deal with
the manufacturer's adherence to code standards as conclusive evidence of non-negligence.
Conversely, several indicated that a failure to meet code standards raised a jury question
as to negligence. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 109 Ohio St. 263, 142 N.E.
370 (1924); Variety Iron and Steel Works Co. v. Poak, 89 Ohio St. 297, 106 N.E. 24
(1914) (possibly negligence per se).
38 15 U.S.C. 9H 1381-1410 (1970). Section 108 (c) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1397 (c),
expressly negatives any intention of Congress to preempt this field and leaves common law
development intact.
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it is possible to predict that auto safety will become a non-issue in Ohio
courts and we will subjugate our beliefs as to the need for safety standards
to those standards established by the federal government. Such a possibility
is awesome and the court should address itself to the question so as to
negate the premise propounded herein."
It is possible to view the court's action as both intelligent and consistent
with prior decisions if the distinction between malfunction and design defect
is valid and if this was actually the basis of decision. If the court is applying
the government standard to establish non-negligence in design, the Temple
decision merely requires clarification. A product malfunction occurs when
the product fails to function as it was designed to do and this failure is
the proximate cause of injury. Often this occurs simply because a component
part fails, i.e., the machine breaks. A conscious design choice results in an
alleged defect when the product is manufactured in a specific way so as
to perform a specific function, but something in that design raises a risk of
harm which could have been avoided had some other design been chosen.
Typical cases of design defect involve a failure to incorporate into
the product an additional or different safety device or the use of unnecessarily
dangerous chemicals in household products. In such cases, product function
is not impaired and the product does precisely what it was designed to do.
This is not to say that the product was designed to injure, although some
persons seem to think this is the case. Thus "crashworthiness" often in-
cludes an issue of design choice, not product malfunction."°
In cases of malfunction the issue is generally simple in terms of tech-
nology, evidence and jury understanding. A finding of liability in such
a case may have only minimal impact on continued manufacture and use
of the product. A finding of liability premised on design defect can have
an exceedingly detrimental effect on the continued manufacture or use of
the product. The demands of a competitive system often require that a
manufacturer base design decisions on a composite of marketing, cost and
safety factors. It is improper to raise the safety factor to a level which im-
9 Although awesome, the concept of federal preemption is not unprecedented and could
be beneficial in the product safety field. If there is effective and comprehensive legislation,
the resulting national uniformity would benefit both industry and consumer. Similarly, effective
state regulation, where the concerned administrative agency intended its actions to have
such sweeping effect, would be beneficial to all parties. The use of legislation to resolve
the problems of product safety may ultimately be the most signifficant method available.
Provided that the concerned agencies retain their independence and demand that industry
do that which it is capable of doing, there would be no need for ad hoc judicial determi-
nations of what was or was not proper at a given point in time. Since the courts do this
with benefit of hindsight, there is an inherent unfairness to industry which would be
obviated were a systematic legislative program established.
40 See text accompanying notes 31, 32 supra.
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poses liability when an objectively supportable design nevertheless results in
a possibly foreseeable, though not truly anticipated, injury. In light of
increased liberality as to the admissibility of evidence, liability in such
cases will almost invariably be rested on benefit of hindsight. 1
It has been suggested, quite correctly, that in design defect cases the
doctrine of strict liability should not be applied since traditional negligence
concepts will suffice. Such a limitation would lead to a more appropriate
division of responsibility in connection with proofs at trial and would help
to eliminate spurious claims. Similarly, such a limitation will make the
burden imposed upon defendants tolerable, without impeding imposition of
liability where there is fault. Such a position is consistent with the historical
development of the strict liability doctrine."
Although cases decided under Ohio law do not specifically make this
type of distinction, an analysis discloses that the failure to establish negli-
gence in design choice was conclusive of the issues. The applicable standard
is apparently one of negligence, despite the court's assertion that there need
be no negligence in a strict liability case. In four recent cases a judgment
or jury verdict in favor of the defendant was upheld. 3 In each of these
cases the plaintiff was proceeding on theories of negligence and strict lia-
bility or analogous implied warranty concepts. As previously indicated, the
Temple decision permitted no finding of strict liability premised on an in-
tervening modification and no negligence in design premised on compliance
with an applicable government standard. The theories of negligence, war-
ranty and strict liability are supposedly independent, but in Temple we find
that there is a correlation: no negligence, no strict liability. Admittedly the
reasons for the two findings differ. If the simple equation, "no negligence =
no strict liability," is truly founded on lack of negligence in design choice,
the remaining recent cases must support the equation.
In Ball v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.," the plaintiff was injured
by the detonation of a blasting cap. The court of appeals affirmed the granting
of a directed verdict on the issue of strict liability and a defendant's verdict
41 See, e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812 (1974); Barry v. Manglass, 55 App. Div. 2d 1, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1976);
LaMonica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 Ohio App. 2d 43, 355 N.E.2d 533 (1976); FED. R.
Evm. 407.
42 See generally Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973); Hoenig, Product Design and
Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U. L. REv. 109 (1976).
43 Ball v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 519 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1975); Strimbu v.
American Chain & Cable Co., 516 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1975); Temple v. Wean United,
Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 8, 326 N.E.2d 252 (1977); Gast v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 39 Ohio
St. 2d 29, 313 N.E.2d 831 (1974).
44 519 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1975). See also cases cited note 43 supra.
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by the jury on the negligence issue. Although this case is distinguishable,
since the negligence went to failure to warn instead of the design defect,
there is some support to the premise suggested. Further support is seen in
Strimbu v. American Chain & Cable Co., 5 where the plaintiff was injured
when a hoist manufactured by defendant was attached to a dumbwaiter in
plaintiff's home. It was alleged that the defective design of the hoist per-
mitted it to fall and injure plaintiff. The district court entered a directed
verdict against plaintiff on the counts of negligence and strict liability.
The court of appeals affirmed. Finally, the decision in Gast v. Sears Roebuck
and Co."' also centered upon asserted negligence and strict liability, though
here plaintiff framed the issue as one of implied warranty. The trial court
dismissed the implied warranty claim and no appeal was based on that
issue. However, an appeal was taken from the jury verdict based on the
issue of non-negligence. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. The pattern
is quite clear: unless negligence is established, there is little likelihood of
recovery on strict liability grounds under Ohio decisions.
Three recent cases in which liability was imposed also support the pre-
mise suggested. State Auto Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chrysler Co." involved
claims premised on strict liability arising from an accident caused by an al-
legedly defective brake hose. Here the defect was directly concerned with mal-
function, but due to the newness of the product, a malfunction can properly
be viewed as a function of design choice. The plaintiff sought to infer the
existence of a defect through the equivalent of res ipsa loquitur, supported by
rather tenuous expert testimony. Plaintiff was able to convince the court
that a directed verdict was not appropriate and that a proper issue as to
strict liability was raised. Although the court reiterated that no negligence
need be shown, it is quite clear that the res ipsa doctrine was one basis
for finding the existence of a defect, even though this alone was inadequate
under the circumstances." Res ipsa provides an inference of negligence, not
an inference of defect. In this case, the actual proof supports the theory
that negligence as to defect is an essential element for strict liability recovery
in Ohio regardless of the court's assertions to the contrary.
Anton v. Ford Motor Co."9 similarly involved a case of defect, this
time in the design of a motor vehicle gasoline tank system in the context
of a product suit. The theories of the parties were not made quite clear,
but the court, in discussing the burden upon the plaintiff, relied on Lonzrick
45 516 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1975). See also cases cited note 43 supra.
46,39 Ohio St. 2d 29, 313 N.E.2d 831 (1974).
47 36 Ohio St. 2d 151, 304 N.E.2d 891 (1973).
48 Id. at 155, 304 N.E.2d at 895 (1973).
49 400 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
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to assert that plaintiff would have to establish that there was a defect.5"
The opinion did not state that to do so would necessitate a showing of
negligence, but on the facts presented, it appears that in the absence of
negligence it would have been impossible for plaintiff to sustain his burden
of proof.
Finally, in Drayton v. Jiflee Chemical Corp.,5" a judgment in favor of
plaintiff was upheld on theories of negligence, warranty and strict liability.
The plaintiff proved negligence, and in holding that recovery was per-
missible under strict liability, the court specifically referred to the fact that
it had already been determined that the product caused injury due to
a negligent design defect, viz, the chemical content of the "Liquid-plumr"
was improper.5"
Recent Ohio cases thus make it clear that to establish the existence
of a defect it is essential to establish some degree of negligence on the
part of the manufacturer. Unless this can be shown, the action for strict
liability will fail. Clearly such a broad limitation is not consistent with the
theory of strict liability. Moreover, if state safety standards can be used
to establish an absence of negligence as a matter of law, there will be no
benefits accruing to plaintiffs in a great number of cases where such benefits
would normally flow from the establishment of strict liability theory. On
the other hand, if these decisions can be read to establish the position that
strict liability in tort will not be imposed for design defect and that negli-
gence must be established in such cases, they are consistent with the doctrine
of strict liability. Such a reading justifies the decisions without emasculating
the doctrine and will permit recovery in all cases of actual fault or failure
to prevent malfunction.
The need for the court to reconsider the ramifications of Temple is
even more pressing in light of pending legislation." Proposed Ohio Revised
Code sections 2305.33 (A) and (B) would establish rebuttable presump-
tions that a product was or was not defective dependent upon its compliance
with federal or state statutes, standards or rules." This provision has little
50ld. at 1281.
51 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
52 id. at 1088.
5 5 See Am. Sub. H.B. No. 319, § 1, 112th G.A. (1977-78).
54 The proposed legislation, id., contains the following language:
§ 2305.33 (A) In any action for bodily injury, death, or injuring real or personal
property caused by a product, evidence that such product, at the time of its manu-
facture, complied with federal or state statutes, standards, or rules regarding product
design, manufacture, or testing, creates a rebuttable presumption that the product,
in any respect that is relevant to the action and as to which there was compliance
with such statutes, standards, or rules, was not defective.
(B) In any action for bodily injury, death, or injuring real or personal property
[Vol. 11:4
SYmPOSIUM: STRICT LIABILiTy IN OHIo
practical effect in the determination of liability in product suits. At the
present time, compliance or non-compliance with such standards is evidence
of negligence or non-negligence and essentially is a basis for an inference
of liability, just as compliance or non-compliance with industrial state
of the art gives rise to legitimate inferences. By raising such inferences
to the status of rebuttable presumptions, the legislation will perhaps have
a minimal impact on the parties' burden of proof, but no significant change
in the imposition or non-imposition of liability.
The decision in Temple far exceeds the rebuttable presumption stand-
ard proposed in the legislation and establishes the equivalent of a conclusive
presumption. The term conclusive presumption is actually a misnomer,
meaning in such cases, the creation of an absolute defense. Framed a little
differently, a manufacturer who must meet federal or state standards to
produce his product will be absolutely insulated from liability in any case
in which a relevant standard can be shown to the court, regardless of
changes in the state of the art or how outmoded the standard. Such a posi-
tion is untenable. The court should reconsider this aspect of the Temple
decision and make clear that it seeks to establish only a rebuttable pre-
sumption. The rebuttable presumption standard is practical and can readily
be applied during judicial proceedings. Such a standard will assist manu-
facturers by providing a reasonable method to defend strict liability cases
as well as permitting a shift in the burden of proof to the plaintiff, and
the plaintiff will be subject to a directed verdict if he cannot sustain the
burden. The standard proposed in the legislation will adequately prevent
the subversion of strict liability into absolute liability, and there is no need
for the judicial overkill evident in Temple.
It is also important to note that compliance with government standards
as set forth in the legislation will effect proof of the existence of defect,
and thus will effectively negate or support claims in negligence, warranty
and strict liability. As indicated above, it is the writer's belief that the Temple
case will have a similar, even more drastic effect upon all theories of liability
despite the fact that the court did not necessarily desire this result.
At least one other element of the proposed legislation will have an
important effect upon utilization of the doctrine of strict liability in tort
or any other theory presented to impose liability in a product suit. The
legislation proposes amendments to Ohio Revised Code section 2305.10
caused by a product, evidence that the product, at the time of its manufacture, did
not comply with federal or state statutes, standards, or rules regarding product design,
manufacture, or testing creates a rebuttable presumption that the product, in any
respect that is relevant to the action and as to which there was not compliance with
such statutes, standards, or rules, was defective.
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which would impose a statute of limitations on all claims for injuries against
manufacturers or sellers of products that occur ten years after the product
was first sold or otherwise delivered.55 In conjunction with the court's utiliza-
tion of state safety standards to limit liability, this provision will effectively
defeat imposition of liability in a significant proportion of possible cases.
The limitation imposed is premised on a number of factors, including
insurance rates, an inference that a product in use for a substantial number
of years is safe, difficulties in connection with the liability of successor cor-
porations,56 and perhaps simply a reaction to the apparently substantial
increase in products liability litigation.
The concept of a special statute of limitations in product suits, even
one which bars recovery before the injury has arisen, is a significant one
which the writer believes to be well founded within appropriate limits.
The proposed Ohio statute has no such appropriate limits. If we are to
protect adequately the consumers and users of many products, we must
focus more directly upon the dangers to be avoided as they relate to both
manufacturers and consumers or users. The manufacturer is quite properly
afraid that the bringing of claims asserting defects in older products is
encouraged under present law. Even defense costs in such cases
can bankrupt smaller individual or corporate manufacturers. The Temple
case is a fine example: the case was appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court
at considerable expense, and concerned a product manufactured over twenty
years prior to the injury sued upon. The manufacturer was vindicated, but
a less wealthy or non-insured defendant might have settled or been forced
out of business. A similar situation led to imposition of liability for an
alleged defect in the gear shift selector knob of a motor vehicle almost twenty
years old."
On the other hand, the user or consumer of a product, especially one
for use in industry, has the right to expect that the product is safe for its
entire anticipated life. There is no real difficulty in framing a statute pre-
mised on the belief that a product, especially a machine, which has func-
55 The statute of limitations contained in the bill, id., reads as follows:
§ 2305.10 (B) Expect as provided in division (D) of this section, no action in tort
for bodily injury, death, or injuring real or personal property shall be brought against
a manufacturer or seller of a defective product for an injury that occurs after the
later of the following periods:
(1) Ten years after the product was first sold, or was otherwise first delivered, for use
or consumption ...
5 See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co. 501 F.2d 1145 (Ist Cir. 1974); Chad-
wick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Note, Expanding the
Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HAsTINGs L. J. 1305 (1975).
87 See Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
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tioned safely for ten years is safe, but the proposed statute does not incor-
porate a provision making it applicable only in the event that the machine
has a substantially good safety record. Furthermore, even a machine which
has such a record may never have been used in a way which necessitated
the operation of its fail-safe device or other safety features. The typical
homeowner has never checked the automatic cutoff device in his gas furnace
and probably has no idea of how to do so. If the cut-off has had no need
to work for the ten year period, but is needed thereafter, recovery should
not be barred in the event of a failure and consequent harm. The pending
legislation would improperly bar recovery in such a case.
To be fair, the statute must take into account whether the injury was
caused by malfunction of a part, especially a safety device, which had not
previously been called upon to function. Such a standard would preclude
imposition of liability in a significant number of cases while providing ade-
quate protection to the user or consumer of the machine. Liability would be
imposed where a specific safety device malfunction is involved and that
element of the machine's use had not previously come into play.
The judicial adoption of the doctrine of strict liability came of age
in Ohio in Temple v. Wean United. If the doctrine is to be meaningfully
utilized in the future two steps must be taken: first, the court must retreat
from the conclusive presumption standard established in Temple; and second,
the legislature must redefine its proposed statute of limitations to take into
account the competing interests which must be served.
If this is not done, particularly if both Temple and the proposed legis-
lation stand, the likelihood of recovery for injuries caused by defective and
unreasonably dangerous products will be substantially reduced. The legiti-
mate goals of the court and expectations of the public will be defeated for
no valid purpose. If the court believes that strict liability is not a proper
basis for recovery and there is authority for such a view, then it should
overrule its entire line of cases from Lonzrick through Temple. To permit
such an overruling by default or oversight is ludicrous.
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